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STANDING TO CHALLENGE FEDERAL
GRANT TERMINATION
ROBERTS. CATZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal grant-in-aid programs have grown to giant proportions. In
1950, the federal government spent only 2.2 billion dollars' on grant
programs2 in areas such as education, health, social welfare, housing,
environmental protection, and transportation? By 1971, the total ex-
penditures for federal grant programs increased to 27.6 billion dol-
lars.4 By 1976, the federal government was spending 1.5 billion
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State Univer-
sity. This work was assisted by a faculty research grant from the Cleveland-Marshall
Fund. The author wishes to acknowledge the able research assistance of Karen Kos-
koff and Nancy Firak and the valuable comments of Professor Ralph S. Tyler offered
on an earlier draft of this article. [The author was counsel for plaintiff in Southern
Mutual Help Ass'n v. Califano, 574 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See notes 31 and 134-
161 and accompanying text infra.]
1. Boasberg & Feldsman, The Washington Beat: Federal Grant Law andAdminis-
tration, 7 URB. LAW. 556 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Boasberg & Feldsman].
2. The term federal grant applies to any disbursement of monies or property by
the federal government in support of programs which benefit the public and which
are carried out by the several states, their political sub-divisions, public and private
institutions and private individuals. See D. WRIGHT, FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID:
PERSPECTIVES AND ALTERNATIVES 18 (1968).
3. Boasberg & Hewes, The Washington Beat: Federal Grants and Due Process, 6
URB. LAW. 399, 402 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Boasberg & Hewes].
4. BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, SIMPLIFYING FEDERAL AID TO STATES AND COM-
MUNITIES 5 (1970); Tomilson & Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards in
Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestionsfor Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REV. 600,
602 (1972).
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'dollars in a single week for grant programs.' Yet, despite this enor-
mous growth in federal grant appropriations, there has been little
corresponding development of federal grant law either through judi-
cial decisions6 or legal scholarship.7 Notwithstanding the substantial
monetary expenditures and the expanding role of federal grantees in
the execution of congressional programs during the past thirty years,
federal grant law exists as a "slumbering giant"8 which only now is
awakening.
For some time commentators have viewed federal grants-in-aid as
conditional gifts.9 As a result, grantees have possessed none of the
rights or safeguards of those carrying out congressional programs
under contract. While rules on general contract law applied to gov-
ernment contracts,10 federal grantees were "looked upon as objects of
federal charity, without any legal 'right' to agency largess.""I There
5. Mason, Current Trends in Federal Grant Lawn-Fiscal Year 1976, 35 FED, B.J.
164 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Mason].
6. Very little litigation has occurred in the area of federal grants. See Southern
Mutual Help Association v. Califano, 574 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1977); National Ass'n
of Regional Councils v. Costle, 564 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1977); National Ass'n of
Neighborhood Health Centers v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1976); National
Consumer Information Center v. Gallegos, 549 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Mil-ka-ko
v. O.E.O., 352 F. Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1972), afdmem., 497 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
7. Only recently has a small body of scholarly material been published. See
Boasberg & Feldsman, supra note 1; Boasberg & Hewes, supra note 5; Brown, Federal
Funds and National Supremacy. The Role of State Legislatures in Federal Grant Pro-
grams, 28 AM U. L. REV. 279 (1979); Cappalli, Federal Grant Disputes: The Lawyer's
Next Domain, I 1 URB. LAW. 377 (1979); Conway, The Federal Grant: An Administra-
tive View, 30 FED. B.J. 119 (1971); Madden, The Right to Receive Federal Grants and
Assistance, 37 FED. B.J. 17 (1978); MASON, supra note 4; Tomilson & Mashaw, The
Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestionsfor Benecl-
ary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REV. 600 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Tomilson &
Mashaw]; Wallick & Montalto, Symbiosis or Domination: Rights and Remedies Under
Grant-Type Assistance Programs, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 159 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Wallick & Montalto]; Wilcox, The Function and Nature of Grants, 22 AD. L.
REv. 125 (1969).
8. Judge Tamm adopted this term in Southern Mutual Help Ass'n v. Califano,
574 F.2d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
9. Wallick & Montalto, supra note 7.
10. See Note, Due Process in Public Contracts: Pre-Award Hearings to Determine
Responsibility of Bidders, 5 PAC. L.J. 142 (1974).
11. Boasberg & Hewes, supra note 5, at 400. See Cahn & Calm, The New Sover-
eign Immunity, 81 HARV. L. REV. 929, 934 (1968). Tomlinson and Mashaw, supra
note 7, observed that:
Formula grants are distributed to all states according to a pre-determined
formula spelled out in the enabling statutes. A state must normally submit a plan
[Vol. 19:87
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol19/iss1/5
STANDING
has been a growing recognition, however, that federal grant-making
is no less important than federal contracting; that grantees can sus-
tain significant harm as a result of an agency's refusal to renew a
grant;' 2 and that since grantees now play a vital role in implementing
congressional programs they not only have significant rights, but also
they should be provided meaningful remedies to protect those
rights. 13
Grantees. . . more and more feel they have rights to the bene-
fits to be obtained under grants and the courts more and more
tend to agree with them.
This concept of the right to a grant derives from several
sources. The first is the constitutional necessity of treating all
people similarly situated equally. .. [Grantees] have a right to
some objective assurance that the discretion in awarding the
grant has been exercised fairly and even-handedly.
A second element that goes into the drive towards entitlement
is the strong value we place on established patterns. If a grantee
has received a grant, he expects when renewal time comes to get
a renewal and his expectation of renewal is not without jurispru-
dential value ...
The third is the simple political fact that the grantee's bargain-
ing position may be very great.' 4
While there has been no judicial recognition of a grantee's right to
for approval by the federal agency administering the program in order to qualify
for its share of the funds ... Because a state which has an approved plan on file
with the federal agency is entitled as a matter of right to the continued payment
of its share of any funds authorized and appropriated by Congress for the pro-
gram, formula grants are sometimes referred to as mandatory grants.
Project grants are disbursed to eligible recipients for specific projects on the
basis of project applications .... Recipients are usually local units of govern-
ment or private entities rather than states, as in the case of formula grants. Pro-
ject grants rely on local initiative and local sensing of needs in requesting funds
and in following up applications. Often referred to as discretionary grants, pro-
ject grants are far more flexible than formula grants and allow federal adminis-
trators considerable discretion in deciding which project applications deserve
funding.
Id. at 600-601.
12. "In actual practice, the failure of the government to renew a grant made annu-
ally in the past can have disasterous consequences. Experienced professional staff
must be abruptly laid off; office leases terminated; equipment and furnishing re-
turned; and often the grantee itself must go out of business." Boasberg & Hewes,
supra note 5, at 402.
13. Wallick & Montalto, supra note 7, at 161.
14. Mason, supra note 5, at 181.
1980]
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a due process hearing,15 some federal agency regulations provide for
grant termination hearings. 16 Commentators have argued, however,
that such administrative hearings still do not "accord the grantee
many traditional due process hearing rights."' 7 As Tomlinson and
Marshaw18 opined:
There are growing indications. . . that the grantees and benefi-
ciaries of many grant programs are without recourse in the face
of autocratic decisions or indifference by federal administrators,
who are unaccountable to a popular constituency and may be
insensitive or unsympathetic to local problems and conditions. ' 9
When unable to effectively enforce due process rights at the admin-
istrative level, grantees have logically turned to the courts. Recourse
to the courts, however, has also often been unsatisfactory. The prin-
cipal obstacle encountered by non-profit federal grantees seeking to
challenge federal grant termination is the fundamental rule that a
litigant in federal court must have standing in order to seek judicial
relief.2° This is no small problem; while federal grant law is still un-
developed, the federal law of standing "lacks a rational conceptual
framework. It is little more than a set of disjointed rules dealing with
15. Boasberg & Hewes, supra note 5, at 405-06.
16. See, e.g., HUD Debarment, Suspension and Ineligibility of Contractors and
Grantees; Administrative Sanctions, 24 C.F.R. § 24 (1979). See also 45 C.F.R. § 16.2-
16.5 (1979) (HEW regulations); 45 C.F.R. § 1606.10 (1979) (Legal Services Corp. reg-
ulations).
17. See Boasberg & Hewes, supra note 5, at 405-06 ("For example, there is no
right to an independent hearing examiner. . . no grantee right to make depositions of
agency officials. . . or to inspect internal agency documents. . . nor. . . a require-
ment that the agency make its program officers available at the hearing.").
18. Tomlinson & Marshaw, supra note 7.
19. Id. at 618-19. See generally Calm & Caln, supra note 11.
20. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth
v. Selden, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208 (1974); U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669 (1973); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Trafficante v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972);
Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400
U.S. 45 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Exparte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937);
Frothinghan v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
See generally Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate
Surrogatefor Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Scott, Standing in the St~preme Court-
.4 FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 645 (1973); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial
Review: Public.4ctions, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1265 (1961).
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a common subject."'" The federal grantee also must survive the
usual reluctance of courts to interfere with discretionary decisions of
the executive branch. Further,
The matter is made more difficult by the requirement that one
show sufficient injury to give him standing to challenge an ad-
ministrative decision. . . .Regardless of which organization re-
ceived the funds, the same amount would be spent and
approximately the same number of [individuals] would benefit.22
The standing doctrine is among the threshold barriers that can ob-
struct access to the federal judiciary. Traditional analysis of the
standing requirement, based on the case or controversy clause of Ar-
ticle III of the Constitution,23 focuses on the personal interest of the
litigant.24 To ensure the necessary adverseness, 25 the courts have as-
serted that a party must have suffered an injury in fact.26 Further-
more, the jurisdiction of the federal courts has been limited further
2 1. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: .4 Pleafor Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L.
REv 663 (1977). Cf. Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article IIP Perspectives on the
"Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979) (author supports
current standing jurisprudence).
22. Cahn & Cahn, supra note 11, at 935.
23. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2, cl. I provides that:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, on which
shall be made. . .[and] to controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party;-to controversies between Citizens of different States. . .and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
24 Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
"[Tlhe standing question in its Art. III aspect 'is whether the plaintiff has "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" as to warrant his invocation
of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on
his behalf.'" (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498-99 (1975)). Id. The inquiry
focuses on the status of the party initiating the action, not on the issues he seeks to
have adjudicated. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
25. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (the personal stake in the outcome
works "to assure . .. the concrete adverseness. . . upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult. . . questions").
26, For example, in an effort to restrict its own jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
has held that although a plaintiff suffered sufficient injury to meet the case or contro-
versy requirement, he must assert his own legal rights and not rest his claim on the
rights of other parties. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499. See United States v.
Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1966); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
The Court also has denied standing to persons having only a generalized grievance
shared by a large class of citizens. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 99. See Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S, 166 (1974).
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by what the Supreme Court has termed prudential limitations,27
designed to inhibit judicial usurpation of powers reserved to the other
branches of the government.2" In addition, the Court has required
that the complainant arguably be within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute in question.29 In a recent deci-
sion involving termination of a federal migrant health clinic grant
30
awarded to a non-profit corporation funded by HEW, the District of
Columbia Circuit Court in Southern Mutual Help Ass'n v. Califano,31
held that non-profit grantees have standing to challenge an agency's
decision to terminate a grant when the agency fails to provide a hear-
ing to grantees prior to its decision, even though direct beneficiaries
of the grant (migrant farmworkers) continue to be served by a succes-
sor grantee. This Article analyzes how the various standing require-
ments impact on the ability of public non-profit, federally-funded
grantees, to assert an effective legal challenge to a federal agency's
decision to terminate a grant previously awarded.
II. STANDING AND INJURY IN FACT
In recent years, the Supreme Court has limited potential litigants'
access to the federal courts by strictly interpreting standing require-
ments. In particular, the Court has strengthened the requirements
that federal litigants suffer an "injury in fact," that the alleged injury
be directly related to the actions the litigant desires to challenge, and
that the judicial relief sought can obviate the injury suffered.32
Designed to ensure that only the appropriate litigants advocate a par-
ticular claim, the standing rule's ultimate purpose is to prevent the
27. "Without such limitations-. . . essentially matters of judicial self-govern-
ance-the courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public
significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to
address the questions .. " Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500.
28. The separation of powers problem does not arise from the issue of standing
generally, but only when implicated by a substantive issue raised by the initiating
party. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210
(1962).
29. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153 (1970).
30. The grant was awarded under the Migrant Health Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247(d)
(1976), which authorizes the Secretary of HEW to make grants to public and private
organizations to operate health clinics for migrant farmworkers.
31. 574 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
32. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S.
26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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judiciary from encroaching on the prerogatives of its two-co-equal
branches and to limit decisions to only those cases deemed appropri-
ate for judicial resolution in a common law system.33
The requirements of the standing doctrine derive from both the
"case or controversy" clause of Article III and from policies of judi-
cial prudence. The requirements of Article III are jurisdictional in
nature and must be satisfied before invoking the power of the judici-
ary.34 Even if plaintiffs satisfy the demands of Article III, prudential
considerations may still limit access to the courts. 35 While Congress
cannot alter the standing requirements mandated by Article 111,36 it
can influence the courts' application of prudential requirements. 37
The requirement that litigants must have suffered an "injury in fact"
to secure standing also rests on Article III limitations. 3' By ensuring
that the plaintiff has a personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy, this prerequisite guarantees the necessary "concrete adverse-
ness which sharpens the presentation of issues.",39 The "injury in
fact" requirement is important because it prevents the federal courts
from deciding issues in abstract or hypothetical factual settings. 40
"The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim protection of the laws, whenever he receives
an injury." 4 1
The individual right to claim protection of the laws was reaffirmed
33. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (principle of separation of powers and
prohibitions against advisory opinions derived from Article III are embodied in the
doctnne of justiciability). Genuine, particularized controversies between litigants
with conflicting and pressing interests ensure that issues are narrowly framed and
vigorously presented. Id. at 106. Decisions rendered outside an adversary context are
advisory opinions beyond the competence of the federal judiciary. Id. at 95-97.
34. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (standing requirement describes the
constitutional case or controversy limitation on the courts' jurisdiction).
35. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975) (standing is a hybrid requirement
consisting of a minimum constitutional requirement and a stricter court-imposed re-
quirement).
36. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 109 n.5 (1968) (attempts by Congress to confer
standing when it is constitutionally lacking are unavailing).
37. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (Congress may grant an express
nght of action to persons otherwise barred by prudential standing rules).
38. Id.
39. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
40. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968).
41. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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in Baker v. Carr,42 where the Court also defined the standard which
must be met to satisfy Article III standing requirements:
Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy as to assume that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional is-
sues? This is the gist of the question of standing. It is, of course,
a question of Federal law.4 3
Since Baker, courts have modified, limited and refined the question
of injury or personal stake in the outcome of the case. Despite im-
portant standing limitations, a lesser burden of establishing injury in
fact has been required to challenge actions by federal administrative
agencies. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court expanded signifi-
cantly the class of injuries sufficient to convey standing for challenges
to agency action.
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp"
represents the watershed for cases addressing challenges to adminis-
trative actions. Data processing retailers sued the Comptroller of the
Currency and a national bank, claiming injury from an administra-
tive ruling45 permitting national banks to provide data processing
services to other banks and their customers.46 Bringing the action
under the Administrative Procedure Act,4 7 the plaintiffs asserted
standing as "persons ...aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute . ..."48 The substantive claim rested
on the Bank Service Corporation Act,49 which precludes banks cov-
ered by the Act from engaging in any activity other than banking
services. Because of the alleged unlawful invasion by banks into the
data processing market, the plaintiffs claimed economic injury from
the loss of potential customers. Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that,
as a result of the Comptroller's ruling, several of their customers had
42. 396 U.S. 186 (1962).
43. Id. at 204.
44. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
45. Comptroller's Manual for National Banks, 1 3500 (1966).
46. 397 U.S. at 151.
47. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
48. Id. at § 702.
49. 397 U.S. at 155-156. The Act in question directed that "no bank service cor-
poration may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for
banks." 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1976).
[Vol. 19:87
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taken their business to competitor banks."
The Court applied a two-part test for standing, requiring plaintiff
to demonstrate not only that he had suffered injury in fact, but also
that the claim was arguably within the zone of interests to be pro-
tected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in ques-
tion," The burden of establishing injury in fact in competitor suits
was distinguished from that required in taxpayers' suits, in which the
plaintiff, to secure standing, must demonstrate a sufficient logical
nexus between his status as a taxpayer and the challenged legislative
actions. 2 Considering the potential loss of profits as well as the ac-
tual loss of customers, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had
alleged sufficient injury in fact.53 Moreover, the legislative history of
the Bank Services Croporation Act,54 prohibiting non-banking activi-
ties by national banks, indicated that the plaintiffs interests were ar-
guably protected by the statute.55
Application of the zone of interests test seems to provide a basis for
standing to non-profit agencies, institutions and organizations which
are conduits for federal funds if agency action arbitrarily and unilat-
erally cut off such funds. This interpretation is especially valid since
the Court's term "arguably" has been described as a quite generous
standard. 6 Although the zone of interests test developed in non-con-
stitutional litigation, it now seems to be a test necessary to satisfy
Article III requirements regarding constitutional issues.57
In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures (SCRAP),58 the Supreme Court articulated its broadest inter-
pretation of the injury in fact requirement. In SCRAP, the Court
held that an environmental group had standing to challenge the
ICC's failure to suspend a surcharge on railroad freight rates as indi-
50. 397 U.S. at 152.
51, Id. at 152-153.
52. Id. at 152.
53. Id.
54. 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1976).
55. 397 U.S. at 155.
56. See Davis, Standing, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 69 (1977); Davis, The Liberalized Law
of Standing, 37 U. CHi. L. REV. 450 (1970); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REV.
633 (1971); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional.Anaysis, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 645 (1973); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administration Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1669, 1723-47 (1975).
57. See notes 105-115 and accompanying text infra.
58. 412 U.S. 669 (1972).
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viduals injured under the Administrative Procedure Act.59 After the
ICC approved certain surcharges pending permanent rate increases,
the student organization filed suit contending the ruling would dam-
age the environment and cause its members economic, recreational
and aesthetic harm.6" Maintaining that its members used local recre-
ational areas that would be polluted as a result of the surcharges'
adverse effect on recycling efforts, SCRAP further alleged noncom-
pliance by the ICC with the National Environmental Policy Act6 in
the ICC's failure to issue an environmental impact statement.62 The
Court acknowledged that the harm alleged by SCRAP existed only
through an "attentuated line of causation;" 63 nonetheless, it held that
the pleadings satisfied the requirement that the plaintiff allege "that
he has been or will in fact be perceptibly harmed by the challenged
agency action."'  The scope of the Court's holding is evidenced by
its recognition that aesthetic as well as economic injury can confer
standing. Additionally, because the rate increases had not yet been
implemented, the claimed injury which the Court recognized was
prospective only, and therefore speculative.
Although the Co'art acknowledged that the allegations must be
proven at trial,65 it emphasized that the question of standing must not
be determined by the prospects of proof at trial but rather only on the
basis of the pleadings.66 The SCRAP decision represents the most
attentuated and libpral injury standard recognized by the Supreme
Court in support of a plaintift's standing to challenge an agency's
59. Id. at 685; see 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
60. Id. at 678.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976).
62. 412 U.S. at 679. Specifically, SCRAP alleged that each of its members would
be required to pay more for finished products; that each of its members "[u]ses the
forests, rivers, streams, mountains, and other natural resources surrounding the
Washington Metropolitan area and at his legal residence, for camping, hiking, fishing,
sightseeing, and other recreational [and] aesthetic purposes," and that these activities
were affected adversely by the increased freight rates; that each of its members
breathes the air and that this air had suffered increased pollution caused by the modi-
fied rate structure; and, finally, that each member had been forced to pay increased
taxes as a result of the sums necessarily expended to dispose of otherwise reusable
waste materials. Id. at 678.
63. Id. at 688.
64. Id. at 688-89.
65. Id. at 689.
66. Id.
(Vol, 19;87
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action. Thus, a plaintiff may have standing even when the injury al-
leged is indirect.
Since Data Processing and SCRAP, the Court appears to have lim-
ited the opportunities for litigants to successfully assert standing.67 A
recent case, War/h v. Seldin,68 is the first of a series of Supreme Court
cases which have greatly impacted Article III standing require-
ments.69 In Warth, plaintiffs were various organizations and individ-
uals of Rochester, New York. They sued under 42 U.S.C. sections
1981, 1982, and 1983 against the town of Penfield's zoning, planning,
and town boards. Claiming these boards excluded persons of low
and moderate income from living in the town, plaintiffs alleged viola-
tion of the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution. The District and Circuit Courts held for defend-
ants. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decisions, finding
that the plaintiffs did not satisfy Article III requirements.
The plaintiffs' complaint identified and described eight individuals.
Four individual plaintiffs were residents of Rochester who owned
real property and paid property taxes to that city. One of the four,
who was black, asserted a denial of rights on that basis. The fifth
individual plaintiff, of latino descent, owned real property and paid
taxes to Rochester and resided in a town forty-two miles from
Penfield, where he was employed. The sixth, who was latino, and the
seventh and eighth, both of whom were black, were described as resi-
dents of Rochester who were of low and moderate income. The com-
plaint further identified Metro-Act of Rochester as a non-profit
corporation whose purpose was
to alert ordinary citizens to problems of social concern, to in-
quire into the reasons for the critical housing shortage for low
and moderate income persons. . . and to urge action on the part
of citizens to alleviate the general housing shortage for low and
moderate income persons.
The statement of facts asserted in the complaint alleged that:
1. Penfield's zoning ordinance allocated ninety-eight percent of
the town's vacant property to single-family detached housing by imr-
67. See Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: 4 Pleafor Abandonment, 62 COR-
NELL L. REV. 663 (1977).
68. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
69, Warth is frequently cited along with Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). The holdings of both Warth and Simon are dis-
cussed in detail because of the impact they have on subsequent cases.
70, 422 U.S. at 494-95.
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plementing requirements relating to lot size, setback, plan area and
habitable space. Thus, the purpose and effect was to exclude persons
of low and moderate income since they are unable to afford the sin-
gle-family detached housing, and since only .03 percent of the land
was allocated to multi-family structures.
2. Penfield's zoning and planning boards delayed action on pro-
posals for low- and moderate-cost housing for inordinate periods of
time; denied such proposals for arbitrary and unsubstantial reasons;
refused to grant necessary variances and permits, or to allow tax
abatements; failed to provide necessary support services for low- and
moderate-cost housing projects; and amended the ordinance to make
approval of such projects virtually impossible.7
The injury plaintiffs asserted included:
1. Higher tax rates in Rochester resulting from the exclusionary
practices; and
2. An inability to lease or purchase residential property which as
a result forced residency in a less attractive environment.72
Before trial, a Rochester Home Builders Association, engaged in
residential construction, moved to intervene. The Association as-
serted that the facts alleged by plaintiffs deprived them of the oppor-
tunity to build low- and moderate-cost housing, and consequently de-
nied them potential profits.
The Court, introducing the issue of standing by a general summary
of previous case law, stated: "A federal court's jurisdiction . . . can
be invoked only when the plaintiff himself has suffered 'some
threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action
...- '" quoting from Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617
(1973).73
The Court further asserted that when "harm is a 'generalized griev-
ance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of
citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of juris-
diction."'74 The Court mentioned other Article III considerations
such as whether another branch of government could more appropri-
ately redress the grievance; whether the injury and legal rights al-
leged were actually those of a third party; and whether Congress
71. Id. at 495-96.
72. Id. at 496.
73. Id. at 499.
74. Id.
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granted an express right of action, the absence of which would bar
standing by other Article III considerations. Further, the Court as-
serted, all material allegations in the complaint must be accepted as
truth, and must be construed in the light most favorable to the plain-
tiff.
The Court, therefore, assumed as truth that the zoning ordinance
and its application purposefully and effectively excluded the individ-
ual plaintiffs. If these assumptions were proved, the ordinance would
be in violation of the Constitution and relevant statutes. The Court
held, however, that plaintiffs nevertheless lacked standing as a result
of several deficiencies in their complaint.
The Court found that the complaint lacked specificity as to the
causal relationship between defendants and plaintiffs. The Court
stated that the desire of the plaintiffs to live in Penfield depended
upon third parties' willingness to build such housing, and found it
significant that "[tlhe record specifically referred to only two such ef-
forts; that of Penfield Better Homes Corp., in late 1969, and a similar
effort by O'Brien Homes, Inc., in late 1971." 7' The Court also noted
that plaintiffs should have focused their case on a particular project.76
The Court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a rela-
tionship between themselves and the earlier projects or others like
them: "The record is devoid of any indication that these projects, or
other like projects, would have satisfied [plaintiffs] needs at prices
they could afford, or that, were the court to remove the constrictions
attributable to [defendants] such relief would benefit [plaintiffs]. ' 77
The Court found that the plaintiffs' inability to obtain housing in
Penfield was "the consequence of the economics of the area housing
market, .... [not] of [defendants'] assertedly illegal acts."7 8
The Court held that in the absence of a causal relationship between
the parties, the plaintiffs could not satisfy Article III standing require-
ments.
[A] plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning prac-
tices must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the
challenged practices harm him and that he personally would
benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention. Absent
the necessary allegations of demonstrable, particularized injury,
75. Id. at 505.
76. Id. at 508 n.18.
77. Id. at 506.
78. Id.
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there can be no confidence of a "real need to exercise the power
of judicial review" or that relief can be framed "no [broader]
than required by the precise facts to which the court's ruling
would be applied."79
The Court's dicta with respect to the individual plaintiffs affects in
significant ways subsequent holdings. It also is confused and is put
forth without satisfactory analysis. The Court stated that the fact the
individual plaintiffs
share common attributes to persons who may have been ex-
cluded from residence in the town is an insufficient predicate for
the conclusion that petitioners themselves have been excluded,
or that the [defendants'] illegal actions have violated their
rights. . . In their complaint [plaintiffs] alleged in conclusory
terms that they are among the persons excluded by [defendants']
actions. None of them has ever resided in Penfield; each claims
at least implicitly that he desires, or has desired, to do so. Each
asserts, moreover, that he made some effort, at some time, to lo-
cate housing in Penfield that was at once within his means and
adequate for his family's needs. Each claims that his efforts
proved fruitless.8°
The Court also found that plaintiff Metro Act lacked standing.
Metro Act had alleged that it sued on behalf of its membership which
resides in Penfield and alleged that the membership was "deprived of
the benefits of living in a racially and ethnically integrated commu-
nity" under the theory of standing described in Trafficante v. Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co.8" In Trafficante, the Court held that where
plaintiffs, residents of an apartment complex, alleged that the owner
discriminated against rental applicants on the basis of race, plaintiffs
had been injured in that (1) they had lost the social benefits of
living in an integrated community; (2) they had missed business
and professional advantages which would have accrued if they
had lived with members of minority groups; (3) they had suf-
fered embarrassment and economic damage in social, business
and professional activities from being "stigmatized" as residents
of a "white ghetto." 2
The Court initiated its discussion of Metro Act with a general sum-
mary of relevant case law:
There is no question that an association may have standing in its
79. Id. at 508.
80. Id. at 502-03.
81. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
82. Id. at 208.
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own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindi-
cate whatever rights and'immunities the association may enjoy.
Moreover, in attempting to secure relief from injury to itself the
association may assert the rights of its members, at least so long
as the challenged infractions adversely affect its members' asso-
ciational ties."
The Court also stated that an association may have standing to assert
the rights of its members even in the absence of injury to itself. The
Court opined, however, that to meet the requirement of standing, an
association must allege that its members sued in their individual ca-
pacity. Only then can a court determine that individual participation
of the injured members is not required for proper resolution of the
case. The Court distinguished Metro Act from the Trafficante plain-
tiffs by noting that Metro Act did not assert a cause of action under
the 1968 Civil Rights Act as did plaintiffs in Trafficante. The Court
stated the reasoning for the distinction as follows: "Congress may
create a statutory right to entitlement which can suffer standing to sue
even where the plaintiff would have suffered no judicially cognizable
injury in the absence of a statute. . . .No such statute is applicable
here.""
The Court further held that Home Builders, who intervened, lack-
ed standing. The Court implied that the relief requested must be
some form of equitable relief, such as a declaratory judgment or in-
junction. "Whether an association has standing to invoke the court's
remedial powers on behalf of its members depends in substantial
measure on the nature of the relief sought."85 The Court pointed out
that Home Builders did not allege any compensable damage to itself
and did not assign damages to its members. The Court was troubled
because the Association walated to sue on behalf of its members as if
they had sued individually, but the complaint lacked specificity as to
the individual injury. Further, the request for individual compensa-
tory damages would indicate that the individual members are indis-
pensable to the suit:
[T]he damage claims are not common to the entire membership
nor shared by all in equal degree. To the contrary, whatever
injury may have been suffered in particular to the individual
member concerned, and both the fact and extent of injury would
require individualized proof. Thus, to obtain relief in damages,
83, 422 U.S. at 511.
84. Id. at 514.
85. Id. at 515.
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each member . . . who claims injury as a result ...must be
party to the suit.
86
The Court also stated that the complaint failed to specifically allege
necessary averments; for example, that Home Builders was denied
permits, that defendants delayed construction or that Home Builders
exhausted the appropriate administrative remedies.
The Warth decision, as it relates to the individual plaintiffs, unfor-
tunately ignores factual assertions made by the plaintiffs which could
have produced a contrary result. First, the individual plaintiffs al-
leged injury by demonstrating the amounts they could afford to
spend for housing. Second, not only were two specific projects men-
tioned and plans for housing produced, but also an association of
home builders intervened in the suit, alleging that as a result of de-
fendants' zoning practices, it could not plan or attempt to implement
a project of the kind the individual plaintiffs were required to show.
Third, the Court's statement that "we may assume. . . that [defend-
ants'] actions have contributed, perhaps substantially, to the cost of
housing in Penfield,"87 seems to indicate an assumption of the exist-
ence of a causal relationship between plaintiffs and defendants that
the Court later ignores.
The Court's rationale for including the comment referring to the
individual plaintiffs' injury and the attributes they share with others
is unclear, since the Court did find that plaintiffs were excluded,
though not by defendants, and several references relate to an allega-
tion of specific injury to the named plaintiffs. Further, it is difficult
for a party to allege in other than conclusory terms that he or she has
never resided in Penfield, for the plaintiff must prove a negative.
8 8
The Court might, of course, require plaintiffs to submit affidavits of
residence since birth. The plaintiffs filed the suit specifically so that
they might, someday, be able to reside in Penfield. There is nothing
implicit about such action or the Court's treatment of the request.
The Court itself states that plaintiffs attempted to find suitable hous-
ing in Penfield but were unsuccessful. Thus, if the Court had consid-
ered the averment to be true, it would have found that the plaintiffs
had suffered injury distinguishable from that of other members of
their class.
The manner in which the Court distinguished Trafficante claimants
86. Id. at 515-16.
87. Id. at 504.
88. Id. at 500.
[Vol. 19:87
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol19/iss1/5
STANDING
from plaintiff Metro Act obfiscates the real issue of whether the
plaintiff has in fact been injured. The Court's holding implied that
Metro Act was not the proper plaintiff to sue under the First, Ninth
and Fourteenth Amendments given the facts alleged in the com-
plaint. The Court stated that "[e]ssentially, the standing question in
such cases is whether the constitutional or statutory provision on
which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons
in the plaintiffs position a right to judicial relief."89 This principle
seems to have been forgotten in the Court's holding that Metro Act
lacked standing.
Finally, with respect to intervenor Home Builders, the reason for
the Court's statements about equitable relief is unclear. The Court
insinuated that if the Association had requested equitable relief it
would not have been denied standing. Yet the Court denied Home
Builders standing because that Association sought only compensa-
tory damages.
Thus, Warth emphasized the Court's reluctance to grant standing
to plaintiffs who failed to allege specific averments in their com-
plaints. The Court emphasized two standing rules: First, that plain-
tiffs must allege injury in fact; and second, that plaintiffs must
sufficiently allege that the relevant law is intended to protect their
interests.
The Supreme Court's predilection in Warth for more stringent
pleadings requirements was continued in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Organization (EWKRO),9 ° where the Court held that
plaintiffs did not establish a case or controversy as required by Arti-
cle III of the U.S. Constitution. In EWKRO, plaintiffs were individ-
ual indigent persons and indigent members of organizations who
claimed they were denied hospital services because of their indigent
status. They sued treasury officials who promulgated a regulation
that provided favorable tax treatment even to hospitals that did not
serve indigents to the full extent of their financial capability. The
plaintiffs alleged that the regulation encouraged hospitals to deny
assistance to poor people and violated the Administrative Procedure
Act and the Internal Revenue Code. Plaintiffs did not sue the hospi-
tals that denied them medical services.
Plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that the defendants vi-
olated the relevant statutes. They further requested an injunction to
89. Id.
90 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
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compel the defendants to suspend the charitable treatment of hospi-
tals that did not submit adequate proof that they served indigents,
and they wanted an injunction to compel defendants to collect all
taxes due as a result of the failure of the hospitals to serve indigents
as required by law.
The Supreme Court held that the district court should have dis-
missed the suit since the plaintiffs had failed to allege an injury in
fact, and consequently had failed to establish their standing to sue:
[T]he five respondent organizations, which described themselves
as dedicated to promoting access of the poor to health services
could not establish their standing simply on the basis of that
goal. Our decisions make clear that an organization's abstract
concern with a subject does not substitute for the concrete injury
required by Article III. Sierra Club v. Morton, supra; see Warth
v. Seldin, supra. Insofar as these organizations seek standing
based on their special interest in the health problems of the poor
their complaint must fail. Since they allege no injury to them-
selves as organizations, and indeed could not in the context of
this suit, they can establish standing only as representatives of
those of their members who have been injured in fact, and thus
could have brought suit in their own rights. Warth v. Selden,
supra, at 511. The standing question in this suit therefore turns
on whether any individual respondent has established an actual
injury or whether the respondent organizations have established
actual injury to any of their indigent members. 9
The Court also held that whether the relief requested by plaintiffs
would actually result in more or better hospital services to indigents
was only speculative. The actual reason for the hospital's denial of
services was unknown. Further, it was not clear whether "the desired
exercise of the court's remedial powers in this suit would result in the
availability to respondents of such services."92 The Court affirmed
that "[p]rior decisions of this Court establish that unadorned specula-
tion will not suffice to invoke the federal judicial power."93
EWIXRO denied respondents standing because they failed to suffi-
ciently show their injury was caused by the petitioners and that their
injury would be redressed by a favorable decision. It is reasonable to
presume that the majority found that the hospitals, and not the de-
fendants, may have been responsible for the injury alleged. This no-
91. Id. at 39-40.
92. Id. at 43.
93. Id. at 44.
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tion becomes clear in the concurring opinion of Justice Powell, who
formulated EKWRO's "causation" test. Powell stated that "Article
III still requires that a federal court act only to redress injury that
fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not
injury that results from the independent action of some third party
not before the court."94  Powell further stated that the injury
EKWRO plaintiffs alleged had not been caused by the defendants
but rather by the hospitals and that the hospitals' reasons for the ex-
clusion of indigents were speculative. Powell concluded by opining
that "it is just as plausible that the hospitals to which respondents
may apply for service would elect to forego favorable tax treatment to
avoid the undetermined financial drain of an increase in the level of
uncompensated services."95
Thus, the EKWRO Court reaffirmed the Warth holding that an
allegation of specific injury is required to establish a "personal stake"
in the litigation. "As we reiterated last term," the Court observed,
"the standing question in its Article III aspect is whether the plaintiff
has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to warrant his invocation of federal court jurisdiction and to justify
exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf."9 6 The EK-
WRO Court also added a new dimension to the Warth test, however,
with the conclusion that:
In sum, when a plaintiff's standing is brought into issue the rele-
vant inquiry is whether, assuming justiciability of the claim, the
plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be re-
dressed by a favorable decision. Absent such a showing, exercise
of its power by a federal court could be gratuitious and thus in-
consistent with the Article III limitation.
This new test clearly originates from Warth. Although the Warth
Court held that necessary facts were not alleged, the Warth Court
indicated in dicta that the alleged facts implied the actions of third
parties. The EKWRO Court addressed this dicta by incorporating it
into the Court's holding itself.
Warth and EKWRO require that a plaintiff allege injury in fact
(Warth) and that he allege a causal connection based upon the facts
(EKWRO). Taken together, the two cases set down the following
94. Id. at 41-42.
95. Id. at 43.
96. Id. at 38 (emphasis in text).
97. Id.
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four-pronged test which must be met to satisfy Article III require-
ments:
1. Is there an injury in fact? (Warth)
2. Are the interests of the plaintiff arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or consti-
tutional guarantee in question? (Warth)
3. Has the plaintiff made a sufficient allegation that the injury
he suffered has resulted from the acts of the defendant?
(EKWRO)
4. Will the remedy requested correct the injury of which the
plaintiff complains? (EKWRO)
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, concurred in
these decisions on other grounds. The two jurists vehemently re-
sponded, however, to both the majority's and Powell's opinions:
We may properly wonder where the court, armed with its "fa-
tally speculative pleadings" tool will strike next. To pick the
most obvious examples, will minority children now have to
plead and show that in the absence of illegal governmental "en-
couragement" of private segregated schools, such schools would
not "elect to forego" their favorable tax treatment, and that this
will "result in the availability" to complainants of an integrated
educational system? . . . or will black Americans be required to
plead and show that in the absence of illegal government en-
couragement, private institutions would not "elect to forego"
favorable tax treatment and that this will "result in the availabil-
ity" to complainants of services previously denied?. . . As peru-
sal of these reported decisions reveals, the lower courts have not
assumed that such allegations and proofs were somehow re-
quired by Article III."
This attack upon the majority's and Justice Powell's holdings clearly
has merit. Although the holdings of the two cases are similar, and
although EKWRO can be analyzed as an extension of Warth, the
holdings collectively make access to the federal court system more
difficult.
Supreme Court cases decided after Warth and EKWRO have ap-
plied the four-pronged test rather conservatively. In Village ofArling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., for
example, in a factual situation similar to Warth's, the Court held that
the plaintiffs had standing to sue. The Court was able to see distinc-
98. Id. at 63-64.
99. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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tions in Arlington Heights which allowed the Court to reach the mer-
its.
In Arlington Heights, the plaintiff, Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corporation (MHDC), a non-profit corporation whose purpose
was to build low- and moderate-income housing, applied to Arling-
ton Heights to change its zoning law from single-family to multi-fam-
ily classifications so that MHDC could build townhouse units under
federal assistance. MHDC had a contract for the lease and sale of a
specific site which was contingent upon MHDC's securing zoning
clearances and federal funds. MHDC made specific architectural
plans for the project and conducted studies which revealed the need
for housing for low- and moderate-income families. The project was
also designed to ensure racial integration. MHDC provided this in-
formation to the zoning board of Arlington Heights. The local zon-
ing board, however, refused to reclassify the property.
Consequently, MHDC and three black individuals sued for declar-
atory and injunctive relief, asserting that defendant's denial was ra-
cially discriminatory and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. A second non-profit corporation
and a Mexican-American individual intervened as plaintiffs. The
district court found for the defendants on the merits. The court of
appeals reversed.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the defendants on the merits,
but the Court first held that the plaintiffs had standing to sue. The
Court set out the requirements of standing by citing Baker v. Carr in
the context of Warth, stating that the essence of standing was whether
the plaintiff alleged a personal stake in the outcome of the case. The
Court also mentioned EKWRO, stating that the alleged injury must
be traceable to the defendant's acts or omissions. The Court found
actual injury in MHDC's expenditures for plans and studies. The
Court also found that the indirect injury to the plaintiff corporation's
interest in building low- and moderate-income housing where it was
scarce was sufficient for standing on the basis of United States v.
SCRAP.
Applying the zone of interests test, the Arlington Heights Court
found that the corporation had a right to be free of "arbitrary or irra-
tional zoning actions"'" but also found that because corporations
have no racial identity, MHDC could not sue on the basis that the
zoning practices discriminate against minority persons. The Court
100. Id. at 263.
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did not decide whether the corporation had standing to sue on behalf
of its members. Instead, the Court found that an individual plaintiff
had sufficiently met the zone of interest test.
[Plaintiff], a [black] works at the Honeywell factory in Arlington
Heights and lives approximately 20 miles away in Evanston in a
five room house with his mother and his son. The complaint
alleged that he seeks and would qualify for the housing MHDC
wants to build. . . [plaintiff] testified at trial that if [the project]
were built he wouldprobab l move there, since it is closer to his
job. 01
The Court concluded there was a causal relationship between
plaintiffs and defendants, since plaintiffs' injury focused on a particu-
lar project and was "not dependent upon speculation about possible
actions of third parties who were not before the court."'0 2
The Court held that MHDC would gain appropriate relief from a
favorable decision if granted the injunctive relief it requested. The
Court stated:
If MHDC secured the injunctive relief it seeks, that barrier will
be removed. An injunction would not, of course, guarantee that
[the housing project] will be built. MHDC would still have to
secure financing, qualify for federal subsidiaries and carry
through with construction. But all housing developments are
subject to some extent to similar uncertainties. When a project is
as detailed and specific as [this], a court is not required to engage
in undue speculation as a predicate for finding that the plaintiff
has the requisite personal stake in the controversy. 0 3
The Court, mentioning the Warth decision twice, stated in its ini-
tial discussion of standing that "[i]n Warth . . . , a case similar in
some respects to this one, we reviewed the constitutional limitations
and prudential considerations that guide a Court in determining a
party's standing, and we need not repeat that discussion here."," It
is unfortunate that the Court did not repeat and clarify these "pru-
dential considerations," to mitigate some of the speculation required
to distinguish Warth from Arlington Heights. In both War/h and Ar-
lington Heights, corporations sued. In Warth, the intervenor alleged
injury as a result of the effect of the ordinance. The corporation con-
cerned with low-income housing sued on behalf of its members for
101. Id. at 264.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 261.
104. Id. at 260.
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injury not specifically economic, yet the Court found that neither the
intervenor nor the corporate plaintiff met Article III requirements. In
Arlington Heights, however, the corporate plaintiffs thwarted plans
for development were viewed as an injury. Further, the Court, on
authority of United States v. SCRAP, held that the requisite injury
may be indirect, though the Court did not accept this argument in
Warth. The question which can only be partially answered is, how
did the Court make its findings in light of the severe limitations pro-
vided by the Warth-Simon four-prong tests? The correct political an-
swer is that in the instant case the Court wanted to decide the merits.
The legal distinctions are few, but the Court apparently found them
persuasive.
With reference to the individual plaintiffs, the Warth Court did not
accept the premise that the exclusion of individuals from numerous
places (though not specifically alleged) constituted injury. But in Ar-
lington Heights the Court found that one individual plaintiff had sus-
tained injury as a result of being excluded. Although it is
encouraging that the Court found one plaintiff had standing, the Ar-
lington Heights Court seemed to abandon its four-pronged Warth-
EKWRO test for the purpose of analysis of this individual plaintiff.
The individual did not sue as a member of the corporation, but the
Court applied its tests as if the individual were a corporate member.
The Court first found that the corporation was injured in fact by de-
fendants, and the corporation could obtain relief, if it was granted a
favorable decision. The Court then found that the individual plain-
tiff was injured, that the defendants caused his injury and that the
individual was protected by the relevant case law. The Court never
addressed, however, the issue of whether the relief that the individual
requested would result from a favorable decision. Indeed, it is left to
speculation whether the Court will now hold satisfaction of the first
three tests will automatically result in satisfaction of the fourth test.
Regarding the zone of interest question, the Arlington Heights
Court held that the corporation had no racial identity. The Court
specifically refused to decide whether the corporation nevertheless
could claim the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, since the
Court found that the Amendment was meant to protect the individ-
ual black plaintiff. In Warth, the corporate and black plaintiffs were
not granted such protection.
In Warth, the Court did not find the requisite causal relationship
between plaintiffs and defendants since it found that unrepresented
third parties, namely housing developers, were responsible for the
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lack of low- and moderate-income housing. This holding was
reached in disregard of the fact that an association of developers had
intervened in the suit.'05 In Arlington Heights, however, the causal
relationship between the individual plaintiff and the defendant was
established when the Court found that if the specific project was con-
structed, the individual plaintiffs desires would be met.
Finally, in Arlington Heights, the Court held that a favorable deci-
sion would grant the relief requested to MHDC. This test was obvi-
ously not required in Warth, since it was formulated only in the later
EKWRO case. One can speculate, however, that since the Warth
Court stated that unrepresented third parties were responsible for the
alleged injury, it is doubtful that the Court would have believed a
favorable decision would provide the relief requested.
The Arlington Heights decision turned on the specificity of the
averments in the complaint. The Court noted that the concreteness
of the facts alleged compelled its decision. Throughout the Warth
decision, the Court stated that the averments were not specifically
stated. In Warth there were no current, but only two previous, efforts
by corporations to build low- and moderate-income housing, and the
plaintiffs failed to focus on any particular project.
The importance of Arlington Heights is that it finally gives some
indication of what must be alleged to satisfy Article III. Further, it
revives the SCRAP rationale which indicates that the Court might
possibly entertain a standing issue based on indirect or non-economic
injury.
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Commission, 0 6 can be considered
both as an extension of the Arlington Heights holding and as reviving
the SCRAP holding and extending its applicability to state agencies.
The State of Washington, this nation's largest producer of apples,
sued North Carolina through its agency, the Washington State Apple
Advertising Commission (the Commission). Washington challenged
the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute which required "[a]ll
closed containers of apples sold, offered for sale or shipped into the
State to bear no grade other than the applicable U.S. grade or stan-
dard."o17
The Commission sought a declaratory judgment that the North
Carolina statute was unconstitutional under the commerce clause of
105. 422 U.S. at 508 n.18.
106. 432 U.S. 333 (1976).
107. Id. at 335.
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the United States Constitution. The Commission further requested
that the defendant be enjoined from requiring that only the applica-
ble U.S. standard be stamped on the containers. The request for such
remedies arose because Washington apple growers stamped all closed
containers of apples which were then placed in cold storage ware-
houses. The stamps identified the various grades of apples. "Since
the ultimate destination of these apples is unknown at the time they
are placed in storage, compliance with North Carolina's unique regu-
lation would have required Washington growers to obliterate the
printed labels on containers shipped to North Carolina, thus giving
their product a damaged appearance."'1 8 Thus, the impact of abid-
ing by the regulation would be costly. The apples would have to be
repacked, sent in damaged containers, or not sent at all.
A three-judge district court held that the Commission had standing
and granted the declaratory and injunctive relief after finding the
North Carolina statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court af-
firmed." ° The defendants had argued that the Commission was a
state agency; that the Commission did not produce, sell or ship ap-
ples; that the function of the Commission was to advertise Washing-
ton apples in North Carolina and elsewhere; and that the challenged
statute did not prohibit the advertisement of apples, beyond the ac-
tual labeling seal. Defendants, citing Warth and Arlington Heights,
asserted that the statute did not infringe upon the function or the
activities of the Commission and that as a result, the Commission
could not establish the requisite causal connection between itself and
the defendants.
Defendants also alleged that the Commission was not the appro-
priate body to represent the apple growers and dealers and that the
apple growers and dealers should have asserted their interests on
their own behalf. Defendants argued that the Commission was not a
traditional association and that it therefore had no members. De-
fendants concluded by stating that even though an association may
have standing to assert
the claims of its members even where it has suffered no injury
from the challenged activity, Warth v. Selden, 422 U.S. at 511
I the commission has no members whose claims it might
raise, and since it has suffered no distinct and palpable injury to
itself, it can assert no more than an abstract concern for the well-
108. Id. at 338.
109 Id. at 354.
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being of the Washington apple industry as the basis for its stand-
ing. That type of interest. . . cannot substitute for the concrete
injury required by art. III. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Organ., 426 U.S. 27, 40 (1976).1"o
Given the Warth and EKWRO holdings, the defendant's argument
seems plausible. The Court held, however, that the Commission did
have standing on the basis of Warth. The Court stated that if the
Commission had a voluntary membership, it would be clear that the
Commission could have brought suit on behalf of its members. The
Court quoted Warth:
Even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have
standing solely as the representative of its members . . . the as-
sociation must allege that its members, or any one of them, are
suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the chal-
lenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable cause
had the members themselves brought suit. So long as this can be
established, and so long as the nature of the claim and the relief
sought does not make the individual participation of each in-
jured party indispensible to proper resolution of the cause, the
association may be an appropriate representative of its members,
entitled to invoke the court's jurisdiction."'
Still quoting Warth, the Court elaborated on the remedies that an
association could properly request, namely, relief such as declaratory
judgments or injunctions. The Court observed that the remedy re-
quested must be reasonably calculated to redress the grievances or
injuries of the members. The Court recognized that an organization
could sue on behalf of its members when "(a) its members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c)
neither the claim asserted, nor the relief requested, requires the par-
ticipation of individual members in the lawsuit."
'
" 
2
The Court found that the apple growers and dealers were injured
by having to remove the Washington stamps from containers and by
having to either abandon the use of preprinted containers or discon-
tinue accounts in North Carolina. The Court further found that the
injuries were germane to the Commission's purpose since "the com-
mission's attempt to remedy these injuries and to secure the indus-
try's right to publicize its grading system is central to the
110. Id. at 342.
111. Id. at 342-43.
112. Id. at 343.
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commission's purpose of protecting and enhancing the market for
Washington apples.""'3 Finally, the Court found that the requested
relief did not require individualized proof.
The Court then addressed the novel issue of the suit, whether the
Commission's status as a state agency precluded it from asserting the
claims of the apple growers and dealers. The Court held that al-
though the Commission was a state agency, "for all practical pur-
poses, [it] perform[ed] the functions of a traditional trade association
representing the apple industry."" 4 The Court found that the Com-
mission's purpose was to protect the apple industry through advertis-
ing, market research, public education and scientific research. The
Court stated that although the growers and dealers were not members
of the Commission in the sense of a traditional trade organization,
"they possess[ed] all of the indicia of membership in an organiza-
tion.""' 5 They elected members, they alone served on the Commis-
sion, they alone financed activities (including the suit) through
assessments levied upon them. Finally, the Court found that the
Commission would ensure the "concrete adverseness" necessary in
constitutional litigation, since the finances and operation of the Com-
mission were dependent upon the financial success of the apple grow-
ers and dealers.
The Hunt decision represents the Court's continued abandonment
or inconsistent application of the four-pronged Warth-EKWRO test.
The defendant's arguments addressed these tests, but the Court ap-
parently found their arguments without merit. The tests were not
specifically analyzed. Instead, the Court reviewed the ability of as-
sociations to sue on behalf of their membership, and provided a
method by which this could be successfully accomplished. Certainly
the surprising aspect of Hunt is that state agencies may now sue if
they perform the functions of associations.
Most recently, the Supreme Court, in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group," 6 has defined the "injury in fact" re-
quirement strictly to include only "distinct and palpable" injuries.'
This restriction has barred some types of injuries from serving as a
basis for standing. For example, the Court has rejected, as constitu-
113. Id. at 344.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 438 U.S. 59 (1977).
117. Id. at72.
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tionally insufficient, injuries to a litigant's value preferences 118 and
injuries suffered in common with the general public. The Court also
stated that Article III requires potential plaintiffs demonstrate a
"'fairly traceable' causal connection between the claimed injury and
the challenged conduct."" 9 Additionally, the Court noted there must
be a "substantial likelihood that the sought-after relief will prevent or
cure the alleged injury."' 2 °
In Duke Power, two organizations and forty individuals who lived
within close proximity of planned nuclear power facilities brought
suit. Defendants were an investor-owned public utility company, en-
gaged in the construction of nuclear power plants in North and South
Carolina, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Plaintiffs sought
a declaratory judgment that the Price-Anderson Act violated Fifth
Amendment due process and equal protection guarantees in that it
encouraged injuries without providing adequate compensatory dam-
ages to victims who would bear the burden of injury while the coun-
try benefited from nuclear power plants.
The Court began its standing inquiry by citing the Baker v. Carr
requirement of "a personal stake in the outcome . . . to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of the is-
sues."'' The Court indicated that "personal stake" required a "dis-
tinct and palpable injury"' 22 to the plaintiff and a "fairly traceable"
causal connection between the alleged conduct of the defendant and
injury of the plaintiff.'23
The Court then evaluated the following effects which resulted from
the operation of the nuclear power plants:
(a) the production of small quantities of non-natural radiation
which would invade the air and water; (b) a sharp increase in the
temperature of two lakes presently used for recreational pur-
poses resulting from the use of the lake waters to cook the reac-
tion; (c) interference with the normal use of the waters of the
Catawba River; (d) threatened reduction in property values of
land neighboring the power plants; (e) objectively reasonable
present fear. . . regarding the effect of the increased radioactiv-
118. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
119. 438 U.S. at 72.
120. Id. at 79.
121. 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
122. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 501.
123. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at
261; Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 41-42.
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ity. . . upon [plaintiffs] and their property, and the genetic ef-
fects upon their descendents; (f) the continual threat of an
accident. . . without adequate compensation for the damage.124
The Court found these effects constituted injury in fact and found the
environmental and aesthetic consequences similar to those in
SCRAP.
The Court then addressed the question whether the injuries could
be traced to the activity of the defendants. Since the Court had no
independent information, it felt bound to accept the findings of the
district court that "there [was] a substantial likelihood that Duke
would [not have been able] to complete the construction and main-
tain the operation. . . [of the] plants but for the protection provided
by the. . . Act."' 25 Thus the Court found that the causation test was
satisfied.
Although defendants also contended that plaintiffs must demon-
strate a connection between the injuries they asserted and the consti-
tutional rights they sought to enforce, the Court held that this
requirement was limited to taxpayer suits. The Court distinguished
this requirement from "other limits on the class of persons who may
invoke the courts' decisional and remedial powers."' 26 The Court
stated that it would not grant standing where the injury asserted was
considered a generalized grievance shared by a large number of per-
sons. Further, the Court stated that a plaintiff must assert his own
legal rights, not those of third parties. Clarifying the defendant's as-
sertion, the Court said that, "This limitation on third party standing
arguably suggests a connection between the claimed injury and the
right asserted, bearing some resemblance to the nexus requirement
now urged upon us."' 27 This statement is interesting in light of Ar-
lington Heights, where the corporation could not sue under the 1964
Civil Rights Act because corporations have no color, but a black in-
dividual could sue as that Act was meant to protect blacks from dis-
criminatory practices. It seems that the Court will continue to
require the first three of the Warth-EKWRO tests, but in most in-
stances will limit use of the fourth test. "Where a party champions
his own rights, and where the injury alleged is a concrete and particu-
larized one which will be prevented or redressed by the relief re-
124. 438 U.S. at 73.
125. 431 F. Supp. 220.
126. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499 (1975).
127. 438 U.S. at 80.
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quested, the basic practical and prudential concerns underlying the
standing doctrine are generally satisfied when the constitutional req-
uisites are met."' 28
Finally, in Duke Power, the Court also catalogued certain pruden-
tial limitations intended to supplement the constitutional require-
ments for standing.'29 Of particular concern to the Court were the
requirements that the injury asserted not be "a generalized grievance
shared in a substantially equal measure" by the public and that the
rights and interests the plaintiff wishes to assert be his own and not
those of a third party. 3 Since they are prudential, rather than con-
stitutional, these judicially created restrictions may be circumvented
by congressional grants of standing.13 ' The line separating pruden-
tial and constitutional standing restrictions, however, is ambiguous.
The Court's recent conservative decisions regarding standing have se-
verely undermined the ability of public interest groups to assert inju-
ries to environmental and other social interests as a basis to assert
standing.
III. FEDERAL GRANTEE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE
TERMINATION OF A GRANT
Recent circuit court decisions have similarly applied the Warth-
EKWRO test conservatively. The applicability of the four-pronged
test was reaffirmed in recent cases in which congresspersons sued. 132
Other cases have reached similar result.'33 Plaintiffs addressing Arti-
cle III considerations, in other words, typically must satisfy both the
128. 438 U.S. at 80-81.
129. Id. at 80.
130. Id.
131. Because one purpose of standing is to maintain the properly limited role of
the courts in a democratic society, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975), the
Court has reasoned that the prudential standing requirements are unnecessary where
Congress, the democratic arm of government, has authorized standing for litigants.
Id. at 501. See also Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
132. See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Edwards v. Carter,
445 F. Supp. 1279 (D.D.C. 1978); Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Dept. of
Interior, 439 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1977). See also Parkview Heights Corp. v. City of
Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972). But see Florida v. Weinberger, 492 F.2d
488 (5th Cir. 1974) (court ignores zone of interests test and is receptive to plaintiffs
who allege non-economic injury sufficient for standing under SCRAP).
133. In Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976), for exam-
ple, the District of Columbia Circuit, applying the four-pronged test, held that a black
bus driver who slipped through a discriminatory screening process and who alleged
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injury in fact, zone of interests, causation and usefulness of remedy
tests of Warth-EKWRO and the non-economic injury allowances of
SCRAP.
In light of the preceding analysis, would it be possible for a feder-
ally funded non-profit organization, irrespective of the constituency it
serves, to satisfy these standing requirements in order to assert a Fifth
Amendment challenge? In Southern Mutual Help Ass'n v.
Calfano,'34 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the issue of standing and Article III requirements as applied
to a nonprofit corporation that received its grant funds from a federal
agency.
Southern Mutual Help Association (SMHA) is a non-profit corpo-
ration organized under the laws of Louisiana to provide social serv-
ices to sugarcane cutters and migrant farm workers. In 1971, SMHA
received a five-year project grant under authority of the Migrant
Health Act 135 to establish and operate a family health service clinic
for migrant farm workers and sugarcane cutters in southwestern Lou-
isiana. The award authorized substantial funds for capital expendi-
tures. The project period of the grant was from July 1, 1971 through
June 30, 1976.
In 1972 and 1973, SMHA filed its annual progress report with the
requisite "continuation" application, and its funds were increased
each year. In November 1973, the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare (HEW) had its first fiscal audit of SMHA and released
its results on May 22, 1974, advising SMHA that it had thirty days to
present any comments or additional information that might affect
HEW's final determination.' 36 On June 6, before SMHA could re-
spond, it was notified that its 1974 continuation application would
danger of arbitrary treatment by defendants' failure to provide a working environ-
ment free of racial intimidation adequately alleged injury in fact.
134. 574 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 247(d) (1976). The Act authorizes the Secretary of HEW:
(1) to make grants to public and other nonprofit agencies, institutions and
organizations for paying part of the cost of (i) establishing and operating family
health service clinics for domestic agricultural migratory workers and their fami-
lies. . . and (ii) special projects to improve. . . the health conditions of domes-
tic agricultural migratory workers and their families . . . and (2) to encourage
and co-operate in programs for the purpose of improving health services for or
otherwise improving the health conditions of domestic agricultural migratory
workers and their families.
Id.
136. 574 F.2d 518, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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not be approved. HEW informed SMHA in a letter that it would not
be re-funded on the basis of the following concerns:
1. It is apparent from the considerable amount of correspon-
dence this office has received from individuals and groups
located in the Saint Mary Parish area, telephone communi-
cations and personal discussion between my staff and inter-
ested citizens from the target area that the community has
lost confidence in SMHA.
2. SMHA has failed to reconstitute its Board of Directors or to
make appropriate provision for the community at large, par-
ticularly the target population, to participate in the planning,
development and implementation of the project.
3. The sponsor has failed to give consideration to the advice
and counsel of the medical and dental committees on Saint
Mary Parish, the primary focus of the project's activities.
4. There appears to have been usurpation of the Project Direc-
tor's administrative and management authority by the Exec-
utive Staff of the Southern Mutual Help Association in
respect to the negotiation of contracts, i.e., purchase of film,
obtaining consultants for staff and board training. Also it is
apparent that employment procedures and practices have
not been consistent with program guidelines and require-
ments.
5. The Farm Workers Advisory Board, Professional Advisory
Committee and project staff have indicated that they have
had virtually no communication with the SMHA Executive
Staff or the governing board of SMHA.
6. Of particular concern is the practice of SMHA which allows
members of the Board and/or relatives of Board members to
work as salaried staff for SMHA-sponsored programs and
projects. This creates a basic conflict of interest.r3
On June 25, 1974, in response to this termination of its grant,
SMHA requested review by the HEW Grant Appeals Board so that
SMHA could argue that termination of the grant violated HEW's
own regulations.13 The language of HEW's regulations clearly indi-
137. Id. at 520-521.
138. 45 C.F.R. § 16.5 (1979) provides: "(a)(1) Termination, in whole or in part, of
a grant for failure of the grantee to carry out its approved project proposal in accord-
ance with the applicable law and the terms of such assistance or for failure of the
grantee otherwise to comply with any law, regulation, assurance, term or condition
applicable to the grant."
42 C.F.R. § 50.404 (1979) provides: "(a)(1) Termination, in whole or in part, of a
grant for failure of the grantee to carry out its approved project in accordance with
the applicable law and the terms and conditions of such assistance or for failure of the
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cates that opportunity for a hearing is to be provided to grantees who,
like SMHA, were denied funding because of alleged misfeasance.
Once an agency has promulgated a regulation, it is bound to adhere
to its provisions. On June 25, 1974, the Grant Appeals Board held
that it did not have jurisdiction over SMHA's complaint since the
failure of HEW to issue an additional grant was not considered a
"termination" under HEW's regulations. "It is viewed rather as a
pre-award decision related to an application for the additional grant
* .1"'9 On the same day, HEW informed SMHA that a competing
applicant had been awarded the funds.
SMHA then filed a complaint in the federal district court alleging
due process violations as a result of the arbitrary and unilateral ter-
mination of its grant. SMHA sought declaratory and injunctive relief
and monetary damages. The district court granted HEW's motion
for summary judgment. The court of appeals vacated the district
court's decision with instructions to remand the case to the Secretary
of HEW in order that a formal hearing could be held before the
Grant Appeals Board. The parties then settled the case by agree-
ment," awarding SMHA $21,180 and providing for the absolute
nullification and withdrawal of all the allegations set forth in the
grantee otherwise to comply with any law, regulation, assurance, term or condition
applicable to the grant."
139. 574 F.2d at 521.
140. The Settlement Agreement between SMHA and HUD, dated March 15,
1979, provided as follows:
WHEREAS, SMHA has asserted various claims against HEW in a suit
brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in con-
nection with the discontinuance by HEW of a migrant health grant to SMHA;
WHEREAS, HEW has at all times denied such claims; and
WHEREAS, HEW and SMHA, without admission of liability, wish to resolve
the disputes and controversies between them;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS AGREED that within thirty (30) days from the
date of this Agreement:
I. HEW will pay to SMHA the sum of $21,180.00.
2. Dr. George Lythcott and Dr, Gerald Barton on behalf of HEW will send a
letter to SMHA in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A.
3. HEW will henceforth not rely on or give any consideration (i) to the alle-
gations in the letter dated June 6, 1974 from Dr. Floyd A. Norman to SMHA, or
(ii) to the discontinuance of SMHA's migrant health grant funds in the process-
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June 6, 1974 letter. 41 The court of appeals based the remand upon
SMHA's claim that HEW violated its own regulations, rather than
upon plaintiffs constitutional claim. Yet, before the court could
reach the merits, it found that SMHA had standing to sue. 1
42
The court initially stated that the question of standing must be de-
cided in light of the fact that the services provided to migrant workers
by SMHA were continued without interruption by another federal
grantee. The court invoked the Warth-EKWRO test, stating that
"[w]hen a plaintifi's standing is brought into issue the relevant in-
quiry is whether, assuming justiciability of the claim, the plaintiff has
shown an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision."'
143
The court first found that the plaintiff had satisfied the zone of
interests test. The court's consideration of the relevant statutes re-
ing or disposition of grant applications submitted by SMHA or for any other
purpose.
4. SMHA will sign the General Release and Covenant attached to this
Agreement as Exhibit B.
5. HEW will sign the General Release and Covenant attached to this Agree-
ment as Exhibit C.
6. SMHA will withdraw its request for a hearing before the Departmental
Grant Appeals Board of HEW, in connection with the above-mentioned suit.
7. SMHA and HEW will sign the Stipulation of Dismissal, a copy of which is
attached to this Agreement as Exhibit D, which will dismiss with prejudice the
suit brought by SMHA against HEW in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia (Civ. No. 74-1293).
8. HEW will not impose on SMHA a record retention requirement greater
than the three-year period pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 74.20 (1977), which will com-
mence on August 31, 1974, the last day of the grant period.
9. This Agreement and the attached exhibits will constitute a grant closeout
pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 56.113(c) (1977), and HEW will not require SMHA to
provide any further final accounting of its migrant health grant pursuant to said
section.
10. No provision of this Agreement is intended to restrict the right of SMHA
or HEW to bring an action for breach of this Agreement.
141. Id.
142. SMHA had assumed standing under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1976), which gives standing to "A person suffering legal wrong because
of agency action or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the mean-
ing of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof," and under the HEW
regulations at 45 C.F.R. § 16 (1979), which establish the Departmental Grant Appeals
Process: "This part establishes a Departmental Grant Appeals Board, for the purpose
of reviewing and providing hearings upon post-award disputes which may arise in the
administration of or carrying out of grants under grant programs and which are sub-
mitted to the Board as provided in Section 16.6."
143. 574 F.2d at 522.
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vealed that while grants for migrant health services were to be made
to non-profit agencies and organizations for the benefit of migrant
workers, Congress "also recognized that conduit organizations such
as SMHA were necessary to deliver the services contemplated.'"
The court noted HEW had designed a grant appeals procedure.
Therefore, "[blecause organizations such as SMHA are such an inte-
gral part of the migrant health program . . . [the court had] no
trouble concluding that SMHA's interest is arguably within that zone
of interests protected or regulated by the statutory framework under
scrutiny ... "145
The court, addressing the injury in fact requirement of the Warth-
EKWRO test, reviewed "injury in fact" as defined in the Supreme
Court:
[While the injury cannot be abstract, O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 494. . . (1974), it need not be significant; an identifi-
able trifle will suffice. United States v. Students Challenging Reg-
ulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689, n.14... (1973).
However, the injury must be specifically alleged by the plaintiff,
see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735. . . (1972), it must
be particularized, Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-222. . . (1974) and it must be capable of
direct redress by the court through the requested remedy, see
Linda AS. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-619.. . (1973). Fi-
nally, the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action
of the defendant, Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Or-
ganization, 426 U.S. at 41.46
The court then concluded that SMHA's allegation of damage to its
reputation was sufficient to meet this test. The court pointed out that
at least since 1951 injury to the reputation of an organization has
been recognized as sufficient for standing 147 and that without its good
reputation SMHA would encounter difficulty in receiving funding
from other sources.
Interestingly, the court found that the same allegation of injury to
reputation that satisfied the injury in fact test also satisfied two other
Warth-EKWRO tests: the showing of a causal connection of defend-
ant, and the showing that the remedy requested is capable of re-
dressing the injury of which plaintiff complains. "While SMHA has
144. Id. at 523.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 523-524.
147. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
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alleged a number of particularized injuries, the one that is capable of
direct redress by this court through the requested remedy, and clearly
traceable to the action by HEW, is the assertion by SMHA that its
good name and reputation have been damaged."' 48
In short, the court found that SMHA had standing to sue since it
satisfied the four-pronged test put forth by Warth and EKWRO and
reaffirmed in Duke. The court did not specifically address the
SCRAP rationale, nor did it find it necessary to analyze standing of
the corporation through analysis of its members. However, the court
carefully limited its holding:
Specifically, this opinion should not be read as supporting the
contention that disappointed grant applicants have standing to
challenge agency grant decisions. There is a distinct difference
between a grantee engaged in an existing relationship with the
government and an applicant initially seeking a government
grant. 149
Having thus held that SMHA had standing to assert its complaint
against the actions of HEW, the court considered the merits of
SMHA's Contention that it was entitled to a hearing on the basis of
HEW's own regulations, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the
due process clause of the Fifth amendment. Expressly avoiding the
constitutional issue, the court carefully examined the relevant HEW
148. 574 F.2d at 524. The Court never addressed the question of whether the
"injury in fact" requirements could have been met by SMHA's allegations of HEW's
termination of the grant and of HEW's corresponding failure to provide SMHA a
pre-termination hearing as provided by its own regulations. The Court instead
grounded its standing decision solely on the claims of injury to reputation traced from
HEW's allegations of SMHA improprieties. Such allegations triggered the agency's
decision to withhold further funding. Recently, the District of Columbia Circuit in
Committee for Full Employment v. Blumenthal. 606 F.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1979), held
that plaintiffs can assert standing upon an agency's mere denial of a procedural right,
and the denial constitutes "injury in fact." Under this holding the SMHAt court could
have grounded its finding of "injury in fact" on HEW's denial of the grant and its
failure to provide SMHA a pre-termination hearing as contained in HEW's own regu-
lations. Presumably, the reason the SMfHA court grounded its standing decision on
the grantee's injury to reputation was to avoid potential mootness problems. By the
time the case reached the court the grant monies appropriated by Congress under the
Migrant Health Act had already been awarded and spent by the successor grantee.
Any subsequent hearing remanded by the court to HEW's Board of Grant Appeals
could not have resulted in the reinstatement of the grant monies wrongfully withheld.
The court ordered the Board to provide SMHA a hearing to rebut the allegations of
impropriety and clear the organization's injury to reputation and expungement of
records. 574 F.2d 528 n.22. See also, Judge Wilkey's dissent, id. at 530-31.
149. 574 F.2d at 525.
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regulations which define the Grant Appeals process and which were
intended to create due process rights for grantees. The court also
considered HEW's argument that the action it took in ending
SMHA's participation under the Migrant Health Act was a "pre-
award decision related to an application for the additional grant"' 50
rather than a termination, and that the former type of action is not
subject to the jurisdiction of the Grant Appeals Board. The court
rejected this argument, stating that while great deference should be
given to an agency's interpretation of its regulations, the Secretary
was, in view of the underlying purpose of the grant appeals process of
affording grantees maximum due process, obliged to interpret the
term "grant termination" in the light most favorable to the grantee.
The court found that by regulation HEW had "chosen the 'grant ex-
piration date in the grant award document' as its benchmark in defin-
ing grant termination . . . and that the Grants Administration
Manual revealed that the SMHA action was not simply a pre-award
termination:
[T]he Grants Administration Manual indicates that there are
two basic methods for ending support of a project: "(1) with-
holding support [failing to fund non-competing continuation ap-
plications] and (2) withdrawing support [termination]." Since
HEW has conceded that SMHA and TAB were viewed as com-
peting applicants. . . then the action taken by HEW must logi-
cally be considered as withdrawing support from, and therefore
termination of, SMHA.' 52
The court held that since HEW's action constituted a termination,
SMHA was entitled to a hearing by virtue of HEW's own regulations.
The court warned, however, that
[wie intimate no position on whether HEW, by more carefully
drafted regulations, could have denied SMHA a hearing, be-
cause that inquiry necessarily would lead to a constitutional de-
termination. We hold only that, under the regulatory
framework in existence at the appropriate stages of this case,
SMHA was entitled to a hearing prior to termination. 53
The case was remanded to the Secretary for a formal hearing
before the Grant Appeals Board at which SMHA would have an op-
portunity to rebut the allegations made by HEW. Thus, the court
150. Id. at 526.
151. Id. at 527.
152. Id. at 528.
153. Id.
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observed that, "SMHA will have been provided the 'maximum due
process' sought by the HEW regulations."' 54
Judge Wilkey dissented both to the finding of standing and to the
decision on the merits. He believed that SMHA lacked standing
since it failed to show requisite interests in the funds and since the
loss of the funds was not a redressable injury. He reasoned that
SMHA, a non-profit organization, "motivated solely by altruism,"'' 55
without expectation of economic benefit, was merely a conduit for the
federal funds. He felt that SMHA was not before the court to repre-
sent the per- -al rights of SMHA's employees, who in any case also
did not have the requisite interest for standing purposes: "[The] real
interest is a public interest, the welfare of the ultimate beneficiaries,
not the private interest ...SMHA attempted to [assert] here."' 156
Since neither SMHA nor its workers had an interest in the funds, loss
of the funds failed to meet the requisite standard of "injury in fact."
Judge Wilkey also rejected the majority's recognition of SMHA's
allegation of damage to reputation as sufficient to establish injury in
fact under the doctrine of standing. Again focusing on the altruistic
aspect of SMHA's operation, he reduced the suit to a complaint that
SMHA "may have lost opportunities to help other people and have
the government pay for it,"'' and asserted: "This interest in being
altruistic at the government's expense strikes me as somewhat ephem-
eral, and I question whether the invasion of an interest of the kind
suggested here constitutes... 'injury in fact' ... 158
The dissent added that SMHA lacked standing since, having not
lost anything, SMHA did not have legitimate rights or interests to
enforce. Judge Wilkey said there was no remedy which SMHA, as a
mere conduit agency, could reasonably expect would redress the in-
jury alleged:
The programs have been carried out; the funds have been spent;
the true beneficiaries have already received the benefits which
Congress intended they receive. This court cannot require Con-
gress to appropriate further funds so that appellant can have the
pleasure of administering a redundant program. Nor can we re-
154. Id.
155. Id. at 529.
156. Id. See also, Hood River County v. United States, 532 F.2d 1236, 1238 (9th
Cir. 1976) (no standing for rejected applicant for CETA funds since the "program is
aimed at aiding migrant workers, not the organizations which receive the funds").
157. Id. at 532.
158. Id.
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quire the Secretary of HEW to award to SMHA grant money
appropriated by Congress in future fiscal years for future pro-
grams. Thus, SMHA's claimed loss of $700,000 in grant money
is not only illusory but unredressable and, hence, cannot provide
a basis for the Association's standing.' 9
The dissent's view on this issue is too narrow and inappropriate; in
view of the interests to be protected did not include consideration of
the Administrative Procedure Act and its implications for SMHA.
Therefore, this narrow perspective must be discarded for the broader
analysis given by the majority opinion.
On the merits, Judge Wilkey similarly rejected damage to reputa-
tion as a compensable injury. Since he believed that SMHA had no
property interest in its role as a conduit for the funds, he reasoned
there was no financial or economic injury. He agreed with the district
court that Board of Regents v. Roth'6 ° and Perry v. Sinderman16 1
would support dismissal against SMHA on this issue.
In Board of Regents v. Roth, a non-tenured professor's contract was
not renewed and he brought suit hoping that the Court would find
that due process requires a hearing before the non-renewal could go
into effect. The Supreme Court held that a mere showing that he was
not rehired in one particular job, without more, did not amount to a
showing of a loss of liberty. Nor did it amount to a showing of a loss
of property. A similar situation occurred in Perry v. Sinderman,
where a non-tenured faculty professor was not rehired. There, the
college itself had no system of tenure, but it did create expectations of
rehiring by its policy and practice. The Court held that this policy
and practice was sufficient to create a property interest and that
therefore the professor was entitled to a due process hearing before
nonrenewal of his contract.
The dissent also relied on Bishop v. Wood'6 2 to reject the conten-
tion that the injury to SMHA's good name and reputation amounted
to a legally protected interest. In Bishop v. Wood, the petitioner was
a North Carolina police officer, discharged for reasons he claimed to
be false and which were "so serious as to constitute a stigma that may
severely damage his reputation in the community . ,,63 The
159. Id. at 530-31.
160. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
161. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
162. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
163. Id. at 347.
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Supreme Court did not accept this claim of damage to reputation for
two reasons. First, on the basis of Roth the Court observed such a
claim "would stretch the concept too far 'to suggest that a person is
deprived of liberty when he simply is not rehired in one job but re-
mains as free as before to seek another.' ,,6 Second, the Court cited
Paul v. Davis'65 where the court held that reputation alone, apart
from some more tangible interest, such as employment, is insufficient
to invoke the procedural protection of the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
Judge Wilkey's reliance on these cases is misplaced, for they are
distinguishable from SMHA. The distinction between Roth and Sin-
derman is the existence of a created expectation for continued em-
ployment which plaintiff Sinderman reasonably assumed in light of
the college's policy and practice. Similarly, in SMHA, the grant
award document created the expectation in SMHA of five years of
continued funding. This is a property interest which the dissent
chose to ignore. "A person's interest in a benefit is a 'property' inter-
est for due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually ex-
plicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the
benefit . . .66 Roth and SMHA are clearly distinguishable. In
Roth, the employee's contract was not renewed after the contract pe-
riod was complete. But SMHA's funds were terminated prior to the
completion of the five-year grant period. SMHA also had the requi-
site "more tangible interest"' 67 than its reputation alone at stake in
the termination since SMHA's interests lie squarely within the grant
award document which is subject to the Administrative Procedure
Act and HEW's own regulations. And while the petitioner in Bishop
v. Wood may have been free to seek another position, the alleged
basis for SMHA's termination effectively prohibited it from receiving
any similar funds from any other source.
Judge Wilkey also disagreed with the majority's finding that
HEW's own regulations required SMHA to be given a hearing before
the Grant Appeals Board. He concluded that SMHA had no right to
hearing because SMHA had no financial or economic interest in the
outcome. He did not even discuss the grant award document, but
rather deferred construction of the document to HEW. "[T]he De-
164. Id. at 348.
165. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
166. 408 U.S. at 601.
167. 424 U.S. at 701.
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partment's construction of its regulations is most consistent with Con-
gress' intent in enacting the Migrant Health Act. The Department's
construction would give a grantee a hearing whenever the grantee
had a tangible financial stake in the grant funds, that is, whenever a
grant was terminated in mid-term."' 68
The dissent's perspective once again is far too narrow. Termina-
tion of a grantee's funds can cause a whole series of detrimental ef-
fects for a grantee. To say that the only interest that the grant
appeals process intends to protect is a financial interest, is to afford an
aggrieved party only a minimum of due process. To maintain that
financial loss is the only injury entitled to due process protection is to
show an insufficient understanding of due process protection. A fun-
damental due process principle is the right to notice and the opportu-
nity to be heard, granted in a meaningful time and manner. 69
Fortunately, the majority showed a greater understanding of the in-
terests SMHA had at stake and of the necessity for a due process
hearing.
The significance of SMHA lies in the resolution of SMHA's rights
as a grantee against the arbitrary and unilateral termination action
HEW took on problems it perceived on its first fiscal audit. HEW as
a grantor agency had the responsibility to give SMHA a reasonable
opportunity to comply with HEW standards and to answer the alle-
gations of wrongdoing. An administrative review of all the areas in
which SMHA allegedly lacked compliance could have been made
and SMHA could have been given an adequate amount of time to
remedy the situation. HEW chose, however, to deny any due process
to SMHA and chose to use the most extreme sanction it had, the
cutoff of funds. 7
168. 574 F.2d at 533.
169. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); see also Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972). See generally
Catz & Robinson, Due Process and Creditor Remedies: From Sniadach and Fuentes
to Mitchell, North Georgia and.Beyond, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 541 (1975).
170. Other possible sanctions short of termination that HEW could have utilized
include: (1) The public disclosure by the agency that a grantee has failed to comply
with federal standards; (2) An injunction brought by the agency to require the grantee
to fulfill any assurances of compliance with federal standards made by the grantee, or
to enforce the federal standards attached to the grant; (3) The disallowance as a pro-
gram or project cost of an expenditure by the grantee that does not conform to federal
standards or other partial denial or cut-off of funds that affects only that portion of a
program or project that is not in compliance with federal standards; (4) The imposi-
tion of special administration conditions on grantee operations, including retroactive
1980]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
HEW's extreme action left SMHA no choice but to pursue the mat-
ter in court in an effort to redress its legitimate grievances. But it is
clear that court review is an inadequate solution to problems like
those encountered by SMHA and not only because of standing limi-
tations:
[T]he judicial function is narrowly limited to ascertaining
whether the Secretary has made the determination required of
him by law, and, if so, whether he has acted in apparent good
faith, reasonably rather than arbitrarily and with some factual
basis for his decision. If so, judicial review can go no further. 171
Fortunately for SMHA, the court of appeals found that the Secretary
had not made the minimum requisite determination but had simply
transferred the funds to SMHA's competing agency without any fac-
tual determination of SMHA's non-compliance.
It is difficult to determine at this time what due process SMHA
would have received from a hearing held two years after the grant
project expiration date and four years after the hearing was first de-
nied. Although SMHA won in court on the issue of its own right to a
due process hearing, the question still remains as to what due process
rights grantees enjoy when the final funding decision remains in the
power of the Secretary of HEW, whose determinations are made
without adequately written or easily understood guidelines and
whose own judgment lies distant from those of the beneficiaries
whom the grants are designed to assist.
IV. CONCLUSION
The recent standing decisions raise several obstacles to a non-profit
federally-funded corporation seeking to raise constitutional chal-
lenges. A careful pleading designed to pass the four-pronged Warth-
EKWRO test should provide sufficient standing to argue the consti-
tutional issues.
In Warth, the Court held that an association may sue on behalf of
its members, and may have standing to assert its members' rights
even in the absence of injury to itself. The corporation, however,
awarding of benefits, in order to ensure the reparation of any individual damage or
prejudice or to correct any shortcomings in the effectuation of federal policy which
have resulted from failures to comply with federal standards. ADMINISTRATIVE CON-
FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATION 31, ENFORCEMENT OF STAN-
DARDS IN FEDERAL GRANT-IN-AID PROGRAMS (adopted December 7, 1941).
171. Comments of Arthur Gang, former Ass't General Counsel for Litigation and
Financing at HUD (published in 22 AD. L. REV. 113, 268 (1970)).
[Vol. 19:87
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol19/iss1/5
STANDING
must assert that its members have been injured in fact. To pass the
injury in fact test, a grantee should specifically allege the termination
of all finances, salaries, bonuses, medical and other benefits provided
to the workers of the corporation. It should also document any ac-
tion taken by its workers in reliance upon their portion of the grant.
The grantee should also allege injury to itself and document any ac-
tion (such as investments or contracts with third parties) that it took
upon the belief that the grant would be forthcoming.
Since Warih also held that courts must determine whether partici-
pation of the individual corporation members is necessary for a
proper resolution of the case, the grantee's workers should sue on an
individual basis as well to avoid possible pitfalls. Employees
threatened with loss of salaries and other employment benefits as a
result of a grant termination would be able to allege an economic
injury in fact traceable directly to the agency's action.
Non-economic injury, under the SCRAP rationale, may also be
alleged, although it is extremely doubtful that it would succeed on the
merits of the claim. Injury such as deprivation of the freedom of
association and freedom of speech may be alleged. Assertions suffi-
cient to indicate a violation of First Amendment rights (such as that
the federal agency terminated funds in retaliation for political activ-
ity) are cognizable. 72 Injury to reputation may be alleged although
in recent case law the Supreme Court has found that injury to reputa-
tion standing alone does not warrant judicial intervention on consti-
tutional grounds.
Beyond the test of whether the grantee association can effectively
allege injury in fact, the grantee must also demonstrate that the inju-
ries fall within the zone of interest to be protected. One of the diffi-
cult requirements raised in Warth is that the interests a corporation
seeks to protect must be germane to its purpose. A non-profit corpo-
ration's general purpose is to address the problems of the constitu-
ency it serves, not the problems of the members or its staff. Thus,
when it is impossible to raise the rights of the constituency, the corpo-
rations's purpose must be described as generally as possible. While
in Hunt the Court found that the Commerce Clause was meant to
protect a state agency, it is unlikely that state agencies would be enti-
172. Southern Mutual Help Ass'n v. Califano, 574 F.2d at 521 n.15. See also Mt.
Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1971); Apter v. Richardson, 510 F.2d 351, 354 (7th Cir.
1975).
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tied the protection of the Fifth Amendment, nor is there clear indica-
tion that federal grantees would be entitled to Fifth Amendment
protection. In addition, the test of causation can be easily satisfied if
it is specifically alleged that the funding was terminated by the fed-
eral agency involved.
Finally, to satisfy the fourth Warth-EKWRO test, the grantee must
sufficiently allege that, if it is granted a favorable decision, the relief
requested will be effective to correct the alleged injury. Therefore, it
is important to state that the injury and deprivation of rights would
not have occurred had there been a due process hearing. Since the
Warth court stated that a corporation's standing depends in substan-
tial measure upon the relief requested, simple allegations of compen-
satory damages alone may not satisfy Article III requirements. The
relief requested should be a declaratory judgment that the agency has
violated the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and an injunction
compelling the agency to continue grant funding until the hearing
procedures have been completed.
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